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8    Concluding remarks 
 
Pontus Odmalm 
 
The aim of this edited volume has been to establish empirically whether mainstream parties 
offered a choice on the immigration ‘issue’. Or were voters left with only one alternative – 
namely the PRR one - should they wish for a reduction in the number of migrants and a more 
assimilation-type approach to integration. The manifesto analysis suggests that, overall, at least 
one mainstream party in each country and in each election under study has been facing in a 
R/A direction. Meanwhile, the PRR’s position is typically more intense than that of the 
mainstream (a notable exception, however, being the UMP in E2). And even when the R/A 
choice is offered, mainstream parties are in close proximity to each other and their adopted 
positions are usually moderately restrictive. As the aggregate data also show, PRR parties have 
steadily moved towards the more extreme end of our four-point scale. This has increased the 
distance between the mainstream and the PRR contender yet further. The latter’s positions have 
also been more consistent and more stable. Some mainstream parties, on the other hand, display 
surprisingly volatile patterns and switch back and forth between positions from one election to 
the next. Conversely, in the Finnish and Swedish cases, one observes a party system 
polarisation. The option available is thus between degrees of L/M positioning by the 
mainstream, and the increasingly R/A stance of the PRR. The evidence further suggests that 
this lack of choice has played a role in the electoral achievements of both PS and the SD. Yet 
in the other cases, the message is not as straightforward. Previous research points to a variety 
of ways in which mainstream parties can counter the success of niche contenders (see e.g. de 
Lange, 2012; Bale, 2010; Bale et al., 2010; Norris, 2005). A key strategy – highlighted by 
Meguid (2005) – is that of the mainstream parties accommodating the PRR by taking over their 
anti-immigration position. This, the argument runs, can persuade voters to return to the 
mainstream. But when we took these shifts into account and subsequently looked at changes in 
the number of votes cast for the mainstream, then the evidence supporting this assumption has 
been ambiguous. It can perhaps be concluded that mainstream stances are important but also 
that they are only one part of the equation. In Chapter 1 we therefore suggested some additional 
possibilities for helping us to understand the relationships between the mainstream parties and 
the PRR. Our contributors found some support for the notion that issue ownership competition 
has become more important when parties contend the immigration issue. However, these 
struggles not only concern dynamics between mainstream parties and the PRR. They also affect 
relationships among the mainstream. It can therefore be as important to emphasise – and 
campaign on – the opposition’s incompetence as to communicate the incompetence of the 
incumbent. Conversely, Kuisma and Nygård (Chapter 4 in this volume), as well as Widfeldt 
(Chapter 7 in this volume), find that the Finnish and Swedish mainstream parties have largely 
not engaged with the issue at all. In the case of Sweden, this outcome is partly explained by a 
converging mainstream, which therefore made any attempts to politicise the issue redundant. 
However, in Finland, and especially following the financial crisis, socio-economic questions 
managed to push other areas off the (mainstream) agenda. These factors effectively left the 
Finnish and Swedish PRR parties free to capitalise on an increasingly split electorate. 
Therefore, perhaps it is of less importance whether mainstream parties offered an R/A choice 
or not. Rather, what the authors of chapters 4 and 7 highlight is how the lack of attention that 
mainstream parties paid to the immigration issue – in combination with some rather 
fundamental changes within PS and the SD – took the mainstream by surprise, thereby 
facilitating the PRR’s success. Whereas PS managed to mainstream its image by sidelining the 
more outspoken and, arguably, more radical wing of the party, the SD instead opted to 
professionalise and reorganise itself in order to present the party as a credible alternative to the 
mainstream. 
 
Equally, one would expect the British party system to be more obviously characterised by 
attempts to compete over issue ownership. Given that the political mainstream (except for the 
Liberal Democrats in E1 and E3) have all been positioned in the R/A sphere this should 
therefore have prompted Labour and the Conservatives, in particular, to make more of their 
successful track records, or at least highlight their competent management of immigration and 
integration matters. Yet Partos (Chapter 2 in this volume) concludes that their strategies have 
largely been ad hoc and directionless, and as a result this has damaged their credibility in 
claiming any form of ownership of the issue. Finally, the Danish and Dutch cases illustrate 
emerging difficulties when trying to determine boundaries between the mainstream and the 
PRR. The constant bartering that takes place before and after Danish elections has provided 
the DF with several opportunities to mainstream its appeal and to exert influence over the 
direction immigration and integration policies should take. This situation obviously challenges 
our initial assumptions about how we should define a mainstream party. The developments 
witnessed in Danish politics would arguably place the party system on a par with that found in 
Italy (Massetti, 2014). Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, parts of the mainstream have moved so 
close to the PRR that the R/A stance has become the new centre ground. 
 
Although we were able to establish a link between mainstream positions and the PRR’s 
electoral trajectory, it was beyond the scope of this book to test the strength of this relationship 
further. What we have been able to ascertain, and which is indeed the purpose of this book, is 
that – contrary to popular opinion and to claims made by numerous PRR parties – there are in 
fact mainstream parties that put forward R/A platforms – many more than we had in fact 
expected when we first began to code the manifestos. But the question of why mainstream 
parties are not fully able to communicate these positions is thus an important one for future 
research to address. And furthermore it must be asked how much this matters to voters. As van 
Klingeren et al. (Chapter 6 in this volume) also suggest, the answer could lie in the 
multidimensional nature of many party systems as well as in the immigration issue itself. 
Indeed, the latter aspect has been flagged up elsewhere (see e.g. van der Brug and van Spanje, 
2009) and could help us to explain why the PRR continues to grow despite the presence of an 
R/A mainstream. It could well be that the emphasis that mainstream parties typically place on 
the material aspect of immigration, i.e. on jobs, on the cost of hosting refugees, and on access 
to the welfare state, does not correspond to the real concerns voters have about immigration. 
In other words, the electorate may be more concerned about how immigration affects national 
identity; social cohesion; gender equality and the country’s way of life, all of which are likely 
to be challenges to frame in the manifesto format as well as in public debates. However, we 
identified an additional source of mismatch. The manifesto analysis revealed that parties are 
more likely to adopt restrictive positions on family reunification than on asylum and labour 
migration. This points to several avenues for future research to pursue. First, does it matter 
which category – or categories – mainstream parties seek to reduce? Or is the overall – 
reductionist – message more important? Most of the PRR parties examined in this book opted 
for the latter approach, whereas the mainstream parties tended to stress one or two types. Given 
the propensity of media and public discourse to conflate types of migrants into one nebulous 
category, it therefore seems plausible that any differentiation that the mainstream makes will 
be irrelevant when the electorate assesses and evaluates all the available options. 
 
Second, is the predominant focus on family reunification a sign of ‘agenda friction’ between 
mainstream priorities and those of the electorate? If one accepts the ‘winners and losers’ of the 
globalisation argument (Kriesi et al., 2006), then pursuing a restrictive stance on labour 
migration would make more electoral sense. However, such a stance has been infrequent (i.e. 
17 per cent). Yet given increasing asylum pressures and subsequent challenges to a state’s 
ability to process these claims, one can observe a shift in public opinion towards wanting a 
further tightening of borders. But any restrictive positions on asylum have been equally scarce 
(17 per cent). Although our analysis ends in 2015, and some of the elections studied took place 
prior to the asylum crisis’, one can reasonably expect party priorities to move in the same 
direction as those of the electorate in forthcoming elections. This is particularly relevant given 
the challenges that conservative and social democratic-type parties currently face in 
maintaining voters’ support and trust. As such, there is a need to complement links made 
between mainstream and PRR parties, and the immigration issue, with a focus on the demand 
side, namely on voters. 
 
And, finally, is the mainstream more likely to frame the issue along the socio-economic axis, 
or along the so-called GAL/TAN dimension? (Hooghe et al., 2002)? Our coding concentrated 
explicitly on the direction parties face in (that is, liberal or restrictive; multicultural or 
assimilationist). We were consequently not able to pick up on any justifications made for these 
positions. Furthermore, we were unable to identify whether, say, a restrictive stance on labour 
migration was justified because migrant labour risks undercutting wage levels, or whether this 
position was explained with reference to any chauvinistic reasons. Paying closer attention to 
the frames that parties use and how they differ between mainstream and PRR parties allows us 
to assess the extent to which competition has changed with regard to the immigration issue. If 
recent debates are anything to go by, especially following Brexit and the 2016 US presidential 
election, conventional modes of party competition have probably altered, if not fundamentally 
changed. In other words, it could be less important that parties put forward solutions which are 
properly anchored in some form of ideological framework. What could matter more, 
conversely, are the intuitions and feelings party representatives communicate about the 
question at stake (Andrejvic, 2016). This partly explains why some mainstream parties have 
struggled to come up with consistent narratives about how they plan to address immigration 
and integration matters. Since ‘facts’ are considered to play a minuscule role in the post-truth 
era, it presents obvious obstacles to the political mainstream. These are obstacles which the 
PRR is not particularly concerned with. In that sense, whether mainstream parties offer an R/A 
choice could be less important. That they put forward solutions that ‘feel’ right could 
conversely matter more. 
 
This leads us to two final reflections. First, is the distinction typically made between the 
mainstream and the PRR still relevant? The dividing line so far has run between the L/M 
positioning of the former, and the R/A stances taken by the latter. But as most of our cases 
show, this broad-brush approach is increasingly difficult to uphold. In some instances, disparate 
party families have all ended up in the same R/A sphere. This very much blurs the analytical 
edges between the mainstream and the niche contender. In other words, are we witnessing a 
critical juncture regarding the party politics of immigration? Is the new ‘normal’ one that is 
characterised by mainstream attempts to reduce migrant numbers as much as possible, and one 
which places increasing demands on migrants and refugees in order to qualify as legitimate 
members of society? But if this is the case, then how are we supposed to apply and use 
conventional understandings of PRR-type parties? As van Klingeren et al. (Chapter 6 in this 
volume) suggest, it might be more appropriate to view the PVV, for example, as a more radical 
version of a mainstream party rather than as a member of a distinct party family. Such a 
conclusion dovetails with findings from the manifesto analysis. In other words, the PRR’s 
position is always, and almost by definition, more extreme as well as more intense than that of 
the mainstream. But it could also open up new opportunities for the latter regarding how they 
compete with the PRR. As the literature on issue ownership highlights (see e.g. Green, 2007), 
should parties agree on policy direction, then it becomes more important to emphasise 
competence and a successful track record. Yet such strategies are also likely to include claims 
about incompetence and opponents’ inability to achieve any of the R/A goals promised during 
elections. This potentially puts PRR parties in an even stronger position since the mainstream 
finds it increasingly difficult to meet its restrictive targets (see e.g. Ford et al., 2015). 
 
Second, is it perhaps time to expand the scope of indicators used when defining and classifying 
membership of the PRR party family? Granted, previous research has highlighted the fact that 
the immigration issue is usually a core feature of the PRR identity, and they are often 
considered to have little to say about any broader societal questions. Positions on the issue 
typically differ from those of the mainstream, but how ‘populist’, ‘radical’ or ‘right’ are PRR 
stances on taxation, labour markets or gender equality, for example? Eger and Valdez (2015) 
find variations on these positions throughout Western Europe. Of particular importance, they 
argue, is the gradual shift away from neo-liberal solutions towards a position that emphasises 
state intervention. The latter stance on economic questions is then coupled with traditional and 
authoritarian positions on sociocultural questions. If the contemporary PRR is characterised by 
fairly traditional centre-left stances on the economy and equally traditional centre-right 
positions on the state-individual relationship, then there is a need to reflect on the 
appropriateness of the PRR label and what it means today. The particular combination of ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ politics is thus likely put novel pressures on the centre-left as well as on the centre-
right. For the former, in particular, they may also result in some form of identity crisis. Social 
democratic-type parties throughout Europe have struggled to come up with convincing 
narratives for the post-crisis era. This struggle appears especially challenging should the centre-
left party in question also have come to accept the occasional benefits of the market economy. 
The move that some conservative-type parties have taken towards the centre ground can cause 
similar problems. Scholars may therefore want to question some of the assertions made in the 
political science literature, namely that an electoral choice matters in the political ‘game’ 
(Budge and Farlie, 1983; Budge, 1994). That parties offer clear and different alternatives is 
often considered key for scholarly understandings of parties and elections. It not only addresses 
the importance of the proximity between parties’ positions and those of the electorate, but also 
allows us to assess the extent of mainstream convergence. But as the results of this book show, 
it is not obvious whether – and how much – a mainstream choice matters. In some cases – e.g. 
in Denmark (E2), France (E2) and the Netherlands (E3) – the R/A option is present and support 
for the PRR consequently decreased. Yet at the same time support has increased in Britain (E1–
E3), Denmark (E1 and E3), France (E3), and the Netherlands (E2) despite the presence of a 
mainstream alternative. It would therefore be difficult to conclude that an accommodative 
strategy ‘works’ as per Meguid’s suggestion. Rather, what appears to be a more likely outcome 
is that the PRR’s vote share will increase when mainstream parties adopt an adversarial 
position. That said, voters attracted to the niche contender because of its position towards and 
its solutions to the issue of immigration may not necessarily care whether or not the mainstream 
offers an R/A alternative. Equally, they may not care whether the PRR also proposes, say, 
greater expenditure on welfare services or a reversal of gender equality legislation as long as 
its key ambition is to reduce the number of newcomers. 
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